This article explores the development and diffusion of market governance institutions in the marine insurance industry as the practice of insurance spread from its early origins in medieval Italy throughout the Atlantic world. Informal governance mechanisms provided the foundation for the development of insurance law administered by specialist courts. Efforts to tax and regulate the industry frequently met with limited success, both because of interjurisdictional competition and because merchants and brokers could to some extent opt out of the formal system. The divergence in organizational form between Britain and other countries, brought about in part by Britain's Bubble Act of 1720, illustrates the potential for path-dependent institutional change.
Introduction
Many market transactions are plagued by agency problems that give rise to a "fundamental problem of exchange" (Greif 2000) , and in such cases markets can function only if suitable institutions enable transactors to overcome incentives for opportunism. Recent research has therefore studied the role of both formal public and private institutions in the organization and governance of markets (Dixit 2003) . Some aspects of market governance institutions begin as "spontaneous" local orders or customs that may eventually "harden" into formal rules, while others are deliberately designed by entrepreneurs and lawmakers. "Good" institutions may tend to spread in an evolutionary way as people copy and adapt useful institutional elements from their neighbors. However, as North (1990) and other authors have emphasized, institutional change is also a fundamentally historical process in which a variety of paths of institutional development may be possible, and efforts to transplant or copy features of institutions can have unanticipated consequences. This paper explores how market governance institutions developed in the marine insurance industry as the practice of insurance spread from its early origins in medieval Italy. The insurance contract -in which a premium is exchanged for the promise of an indemnity in the event of a specified loss -was an important innovation that enabled risk-averse merchants to pursue high-risk, high-return trading opportunities that they might otherwise have foregone.
However, insurance transactions were plagued by serious agency problems and information asymmetries that created a need for enforcement institutions to govern behavior and mediate disputes.
The next section describes how the industry developed and outlines the major agency problems inherent in marine insurance transactions. Section 3 describes how the institutional governance mechanisms that evolved in response to these agency problems developed as informal governance mechanisms within the community of merchants became supplemented by formal insurance law applied by specialist courts. Section 4 discusses the efforts of political authorities to regulate the industry, and why such efforts frequently met with limited success.
Section 5 describes the variety of organizational forms that emerged, and how over time, the industry followed distinct paths of institutional development in different countries. Section 6 concludes.
Early Development of Marine Insurance
During the thirteenth and early fourteenth century, the European system of trade based on traveling merchants, caravan trade and the Champagne fairs was in decline, and trade was increasingly carried out by sedentary merchants who employed agents in other ports to handle the sale of their merchandise and the purchase of return cargoes. Much of this trade was carried on by sea. A vessel laden with cargo represented a substantial capital outlay, and merchant vessels faced a wide variety of dangers including storms, fire, piracy, and during wartime, enemy capture. Merchants therefore sought ways to mitigate these risks.
When possible, merchants could reduce the probability of large losses by spreading their trade among a variety of destinations, and sending their goods in smaller parcels on several different vessels. However, this strategy had obvious drawbacks, such as the possible lack of multiple vessels bound to a desired destination, and the need to negotiate with multiple ship-owners, and to entrust goods to a larger number of agents. To reduce the danger of enemy capture, vessels sometimes traveled in convoy, particularly in wartime, but this too entailed costs: vessels would have to wait in port until their escort was ready to sail, and then the convoy could sail only as fast as the slowest ship, driving up wage expenditures and other costs. Furthermore, with many vessels arriving at once, the destination market might be glutted, driving down the sale price of goods and driving up the price of supplies and cargo for the return voyage (Barbour 1929 ).
Since ancient times, merchants had used "sea loans" -loans which were to be repaid only if the vessel arrived safely -as a way of sharing risk. Essentially, a sea loan bundled the provision of credit to a merchant or shipowner with insurance against sea risk, the rate of interest on the loan being set high enough to compensate for the risk. After sea loans were condemned in 1236 by Pope Gregory IX as a violation of the church's prohibition on usury, merchants employed a variety of artful disguises to mimic their function, such as "interest-free" loans to the merchant, repayable only if the vessel arrived safely, in which the sum actually lent was overstated to disguise the true interest payment. They also devised contracts which came close to true insurance contracts, in that the transfer of risk was the primary object, for example by means of a fictitious loan to the underwriter to be "repaid" to the merchant only if the vessel or goods did not arrive safely.
1
An alternative method of sharing risk was a commenda contract, in which a sedentary merchant entered into partnership with a traveling merchant, providing funds in exchange for a share of the profit on the voyage, and thus exposing himself to both sea risk and commercial risk. Yadira González de Lara (2005) has pointed out that although commenda contracts were superior to sea loans from a risk-sharing perspective, they required the provider of capital to have full information about commercial profits. Thus, sea loans may have functioned as a second-best response in situations where there was hidden information about the profits from a venture (whereas the arrival of a vessel in port was readily verifiable). In both cases, however, the primary function of the contract was the provision of capital to an entrepreneur, 2 and the scope of risk-sharing was limited to the transfer of risk from a borrower to the lender or partner. As such, from a risk-spreading perspective, both sea loans and commenda contracts were imperfect substitutes for true insurance contracts in which the primary object was to spread risk among many people.
The earliest recorded examples of modern insurance contracts -involving the transfer of maritime risk on a cargo or vessel (or both) from a merchant to a group of underwriters in exchange for a premium -date from the Italian city-states in the mid-fourteenth century.
3
Transactions were often intermediated by brokers whose role was to find a group of underwriters to cover a risk, negotiate the premium, and draw up the policy. The underwriters signed their names on the policy along with the amount they were willing to cover. Because a knowledge of trade was indispensable for evaluating risks, many underwriters were typically merchants themselves, so this method of insurance functioned in part as a means of spreading risk within the community of merchants. Depending on the size of the risk and the number of underwriters available, policies might have anything from one or two to as many as sixty or seventy underwriters.
The knowledge and use of insurance spread rapidly, carried by the Italian merchants who did business throughout the Mediterranean and Europe. By the early fifteenth century, 2 Sometimes shipowners would give merchants a sea loan for some fraction of the value of the goods to be transported on their vessel. As the loan was repayable only if the goods arrived in safety, this can be seen as an attempt to overcome agency problems between the merchant and the shipowner to whom he entrusted his goods.
3 de Roover (1945); Nelli (1972 Barbour (1929), p.581. 9 Except during brief periods, including the 7 years war, when Dutch trade benefitted from their role as neutral carriers (Crowhurst 1972) .
10 In 1755, a merchant noted that "the Business of Insurance is carried to a much greater Extent in London, than in any other City in Europe. Insurances daily are made here on Adventures by foreign Ships, as well as others whose Risks are wholly determinable in foreign Dominions." (Magens 1755, Vol.1, p.v). tween underwriting centres. A cargo of goods consigned from an agent in port X to a merchant in port Y might be insured either at X or Y, or it might be insured at a third port as a "cross risk" (a risk between two foreign ports). Ceteris paribus, a merchant would prefer to insure locally, thereby avoiding the need to pay an agent to carry out the transaction, and facilitating the resolution of disputes and recovery of funds in case of a loss. However, insuring at a port other than the port of origin of the goods meant running the risk that the news of a loss would arrive before the order to insure, leaving the merchant uninsured.
Merchants therefore frequently directed their agents in other ports to purchase insurance on their behalf. In 1438, for example, a Venetian merchant reminded his cousin in Seville that "if you should ship goods of mine from one hundred ducats upwards, I want you to insure them there, if you can, and if you cannot, then write to me in time, that I may have them insured here."
11
In deciding where to insure, the degree of liquidity in the market, the reputation of the market as a whole (the good faith of the underwriters, speed of settlement of losses), the regulatory environment (taxes and restrictions on trade), and the availability of impartial and swift arbitration in case of a dispute were also important considerations. Merchants often found they could get the best rates by insuring at the most established insurance centres, where the concentration of underwriting expertise and capital ensured a competitive price. (Miquelon 1978, p.30) . It was also not uncommon for a merchant to purchase insurance in multiple ports on the same voyage.
12 All of this made for a competitive and integrated market. less likely to be taken as a prize, or condemned in a prize court if taken; and so on. Although underwriters made diligent efforts to obtain the latest information which might affect risks, merchants often knew more about some aspects of the risk, and had incentives to conceal negative private information in order to try to keep the premium low.
Agency problems
Merchants purchasing insurance, on the other hand, also had to confront the possibility of opportunism on the part of the underwriters. The value of the policy ultimately depended on whether the underwriters would pay losses, and the financial stability of individual underwriters was frequently uncertain, especially in wartime. And even solvent underwriters could attempt to delay or avoid payment of losses by contesting claims and demanding proofs that might be difficult to come by given the slow speed of communication, and the difficulty of proving what had happened at sea.
In the light of these agency problems, it was crucial for both parties to a marine insurance contract to be able to trust each other to act "in utmost good faith", and the reputation of trading partners was a paramount concern. Merchants were willing to pay higher premiums to underwriters who could be relied on to pay claims promptly and whom they perceived to be financially secure. Underwriters, likewise, tried to confine their underwriting to merchants they could trust.
Governance of insurance transactions
By the fifteenth century, the wording of Italian policies had become relatively standardized, and by the sixteenth century, the use of printed policies had become common, with spaces left for the broker to fill in the idiosyncratic details of the risk -the name of the vessel, its origin and destination, the rate of premium and sum assured, and any special clauses. 14 As the practice of insurance spread from Italy to Spain, Holland, France, Britain and elsewhere, rather than re-invent insurance from scratch, merchants in these countries simply borrowed and adapted the Italian innovation, including the routines and customs which they learned from the Italian merchants with whom they did business. They used contracts translated 14 de Roover (1945), p.198. and adapted from the Italian forms; at first, some even wrote the contracts in Italian. As a result, the institutions governing marine insurance in different countries developed from a relatively uniform starting point.
Over time, however, variations emerged both in the form of the insurance contract, in the informal "customary" rules and practices that merchants followed, and in the regulations promulgated by political authorities. It is hard to be precise about the degree of divergence in these various kinds of "rules". In England, where the earliest policies were written in
Italian during the mid-sixteenth century, there was some variation in policy forms during the sixteenth century, but a relatively standardized form had emerged by the end of the century. 15 Magens (1755) reproduces a variety of policy forms from different localities at various times, revealing that while the core of the policy was relatively uniform and universal, some variations had also crept into the details of the form of the policy and specific conditions.
Kadens (2012) argues that the degree of variation in the informal customs merchants used to "fill the gaps" in the contract was likely considerably greater. We can also observe differences (as well as similarities) in the regulations and judicial structures across localities, but it is often difficult to be sure whether these regulations reflected formalizations of differences in local customs, or whether they represented attempts to change exisiting practice or to bring about uniformity where there was variation. And in any case, as we will see below, it is clear that many regulations were ignored, particularly when they clashed with merchant practice.
Notwithstanding some local variations in the policy/contract, informal customs, and formal regulations, however, the main features of the insurance contract remained largely consistent across Europe. The perils enumerated in a late eighteenth century English policy are remarkably similar to those contained in policies from other countries and to those in Italian policies from 250 years earlier. 16 In 1791, a judge noted that "A policy of assurance has at all times been considered in courts of law as an absurd and incoherent instrument".
17
Nevertheless, over time the wording of the policy, though archaic and convoluted, became "consecrated by centuries of usage. However clumsily it may be expressed, its meaning is clear, because it has generations of legal interpretations hanging almost to every word".
18
The integrated and competitive nature of the international insurance market acted as a constraint on institutional diversity. A typical merchant would over time be party to a variety of insurance contracts both in their home port and in others, and would be made aware of any pertinent differences in practices or policies through correspondence with brokers and agents (Kadens 2012) . This facilitated the spread of contractual innovations that were considered beneficial while tending to weed out undesirable innovations and harmonize rules across jurisdictions. Guido Rossi (2012) , for example, describes how in the late sixteenth century, English merchants adopted some Dutch modifications to their existing insurance practices (of largely Italian origin): "the close commercial relations between the two countries brought their respective rules on insurance to a remarkable degree of resemblance with each other"
(ibid, p.261). Similarly, interjurisdictional competition constrained the degree to which governments could regulate contractual terms or tax transactions: merchants who found a regulatory environment burdensome could simply insure elsewhere.
Informal governance
At first, the enforcement of insurance contracts was almost entirely informal. Indeed, in fifteenth century Venice, although most policies were issued in writing, some insurances were simply verbal agreements, relying entirely on the reputation of the participants and the broker who mediated the transaction. 19 In the event of a dispute, it was usual for each party to choose a reputable merchant as an arbitrator; the two arbitrators would choose a third; and both parties would agree to abide by a majority decision of the three thus chosen.
This was a cost-effective and expeditious way to deal with disputes according to mercantile 17 Justice Buller, quoted by Wright and Fayle (1928: 131) .
18 Fayle (1928), p.131. 19 Stefani (1958) , p.83.
custom, whereas using formal courts might be costly, slow, and arbitrary (as the judges lacked expertise in mercantile matters). In England, early policies contained a clause stating that any disputes would be referred to impartial merchants 'withoute goying to any lawe', and in any case, insurance policies had no legal standing and technically there could be no remedy at law. 20 In 1570, an owner of insured goods petitioned for the Court of Admiralty to appoint arbitrators to hear his case, as "the ordre of insurance is not grounded upon the lawes of the realm, but rather a civill and maritime cause to be determined and decided by civilians, or else in the highe courte of Admiraltye".
21
Brokers often played a crucial role in informal enforcement of transactions. Their primary role was to draw up the policy and find underwriters, and to transmit premiums to underwriters and collect losses on behalf of the insured. For these administrative tasks, the broker earned a commission, which was usually a fixed fee plus a percentage of the premium or sum assured. In fifteenth-century Venice brokers were already "an essential factor" in the transaction of insurance business (Stefani 1958, p.83) , and brokers played a key role in the marine insurance market in Amsterdam, London, and other cities. In 1708, for example, one
London observer noted that "Offices that Insure Ships or their Cargo are many about the Royal Exchange, as
Mr. Hall's, Mr. Bevis's, etc., who for a Premium paid down procure those that will subscribe Policies for Insuring Ships (with their Cargo) bound to or from any part of the World, the Premium being proportioned to the Distance, Danger of Seas, Enemies, etc."
22
Yet the broker's role went far beyond matching buyers and sellers. Reputable brokers offered their business only to underwriters whom they considered to be financially secure, and who did not quibble about details when it came to the payment of good-faith claims.
Underwriters sought the business the broker had to offer, and were therefore constrained from opportunistically contesting claims too readily by the fear of developing a reputation 20 Jones (1960), p.55, 59 . 21 quoted by Vance (1908) , p.12.
22 Edward Hatton, quoted by Wright and Fayle (1928) , p.40.
for litigiousness. Merchants, in turn, hired reputable brokers because they could get policies underwritten by reliable underwriters more quickly, and at lower premiums, than the merchant could achieve directly; and they were aware that suspicious dealings might make it harder to place business with the broker in the future.
To be effective in this role, it was critical that brokers be able, as far as possible, to observe the detailed circumstances of a transaction and the actions of both parties. Accordingly, brokers not only effected the policy initially (so they knew what information had or had not been disclosed to the underwriter at the time the policy was made, and the terms of the policy), but they were also conveyed premiums from the merchant to the underwriter, and were responsible for collecting payment from underwriters in the case of a loss (which enabled them to observe how fairly the underwriter dealt with claims). Thus, brokers played a key role in informal contract enforcement by cultivating trusting relationships with all parties.
Development of insurance law
Despite this widespread reliance on informal governance, some disputes inevitably found their way into formal courts of law. In sixteenth-century England, for example, merchants occasionally turned to formal courts when one party did not wish to submit to, or refused to abide by the results of, non-legal arbitration. The effectiveness of these regulations varied, but they often had limited effect, especially when they clashed with merchants' interests or practices. For example, González de Lara (2008) has shown that by the thirteenth century, the Venetian state had successfully developed what she terms a "public-order, repuation-based" institutional framework: a formal system for registering the details of commercial contracts, adjudicating disputes, and punishing offenders, and was able to enforce compliance by controlling access to valuable commerical privileges and rents generated by the state. The Venetians began applying this framework to regulate insurance markets as early as 1421 (with a rule forbidding insurance of foreign vessels), and legislation grew in volume during the succeeding centuries, culminating in a codification of insurance law in 1786. Many of the regulations passed, however, were largely ineffective. In 1602, for example, it was decreed that no foreign vessels purchased by Venetian subjects could be insured for more than two-thirds of their value. However, Stefani (1958, p.115) notes that "As was usually the case, the order was barely observed". A regulation prohibiting the insurance of cross-risks passed in 1586 was similarly ignored. In 1605, a renewed effort was made to enforce the ban on cross-risks, and rewards were offered to informants, but this prompted merchant opposition, forcing the senate to backtrack, so in 1607 the regulation was weakened substantially. Again, however, the prohibition on insurance of cross-risks was largely ignored, leading to another restatement of the regulation in 1670, before it was finally repealed in 1682. 
Regulation of contracts
Governments periodically attempted to restrict the wording of insurance policies, often in an effort to compel uniformity in order to control fraud. In 1563, the authorities in Antwerp prescribed that policies that did not follow the form then in use on the Antwerp market would be legally void. 31 This proved too restrictive, however, and in 1571 the nullity of other policy forms was reversed. In 1571, the Venetian government issued a regulation requiring that insurance policies be printed rather than written by hand. 32 In 1688, Amsterdam passed a regulation to standardize the policies used by different brokers, including penalties for brokers who used any other form.
33
Other regulations dealt with aspects of the contract not specified in the policy, often by formalizing existing customs concerning matters such as the timing of the risk or the means of valuing goods. For example, a policy on goods generally began from the time the goods left shore, and continued until they were safely landed. In London, however, the risk began only when the goods arrived on board. 34 Insurance on a vessel generally continued until the vessel had been moored for 24 hours in safety. 35 When insuring a vessel, the value of the vessel was generally specified on the policy, but when insuring goods, the general custom was to value them at their invoice cost together with any shipping charges incurred, and this custom was formalized in ordinances such as that of Hamburg in 1731. 36 It was however generally legal to specify a higher value for the goods in the policy, such as the price they would have fetched at the intended point of sale, if a merchant wished not just to recover his costs but also some of his expected profits. In the case of a "general average" loss, in which some goods were thrown overboard to save a ship in distress, the owners of the goods thereby saved (or their underwriters) were expected to compensate those whose 31 Van Niekerk (1998), p.486-7. 32 Stefani (1958), p.104. 33 Policies also had to be signed by the Secretary of the Chamber of Insurance (for a fee). In 1721 Rotterdam passed a similar rule prescribing particular forms of policy, but without requiring that policies be signed. Go (2009), p.109; Van Niekerk (1998), p.488-9. 34 So, for example, goods damaged while being transferred to the ship in small boats would not be covered. In 1783, the French writer Emerigon noted that "During the last war between France and England the commerce of insurance was not interrupted, and it continues in the same manner during the present, the insurance being effected through agents and for account of owners, and thus far the respective losses have been paid without difficulty" (Emerigon 1783, p.105 
Taxation and Registration
A common method of attempting to gain control over the industry was to require that policies be registered with the authorities. The usual justification for this was to prevent merchants fraudulently insuring the same goods multiple times with different underwriters.
By charging a registration fee, registration of policies could also serve as a source of revenue, and if effectively enforced, it would enable governments to control the wording of policies and restrict what could be insured. Interestingly, proposals to introduce registration of policies were often made by enterprising merchants who hoped to gain the monopoly on registration for themselves. In 1555, for example, one Jean-Baptiste Ferufini petitioned the Spanish government to establish an insurance registration office in Antwerp, offering in exchange an annual payment of 500 guilders. Not surprisingly, the proposal prompted vigorous opposition from merchants, but in 1559 it was approved. Merchants were required to pay a registration fee, and only registered policies would be enforceable in the local courts. Yet, although an ordinance was drafted to establish the monopoly, there is no evidence that the registration office ever functioned. Most likely, merchants simply ignored it. 44 In 1577, a man named Francesco di Nasi made a similar proposal to register policies in Venice, pledging payment of 800 ducats a year to the government. The government board in charge of financial and economic affairs, supported by merchants and brokers, rejected the proposal on the grounds that it would stifle trade.
45
In 1575, Richard Candeler managed to obtain a patent to establish an "Office of Assurances" with a monopoly on the registration of insurance policies in London. Initially,
Candeler also had a monopoly on writing policies, but that element of the patent was abandoned in the face of opposition from merchants, brokers and underwriters. Malynes, writing 
46
Some governments attempted to tax insurance transactions by imposing a stamp duty on policies. Their ability to do so was constrained, however, by the possibility of tax evasion, and the knowledge that merchants might choose to insure elsewhere. For example, a proposal in 1571 to tax insurance ordered by foreign merchants in Venice was not enacted, in part because of a desire not to stifle trade, and in part because of an assumption that insurers would simply avoid the tax by insuring informally. In 1703 and 1768, proposals for a more general tax on insurance transactions in Venice were also turned down, on the basis that a tax would lead merchants to insure elsewhere. 47 In Holland, stamp duty was first imposed in the early seventeenth century. Some merchants partially evaded the duty by using one policy to cover several vessels, so in 1707 that practice was outlawed. Unstamped policies were legally void, but they nevertheless continued to be widely used, and repeated regulatory efforts to counter their use in 1721, 1744, 1773 and 1775 met with limited success.
48
In England, stamp duty was first imposed in 1694 as a temporary measure to fund the war with France, and during the eighteenth century, stamp duty was again periodically introduced in wartime. However, it was widely evaded by the use of "slips" -pieces of paper on which the broker sketched the details of the risk in order to attempt to find underwriters, prior to filling out a formal policy -in place of stamped policies. It was not until 1807 that the Commissioners of Stamps prosecuted a Lloyd's subscriber for the use of slips. This led to a furore, the solution to which was the introduction of "stamped slips" in 1814. Far into the nineteenth century, the law required the use of stamped slips, but in 1867 it emerged that "no person has ever used or seen a slip so stamped. The Distributor of Stamps in the City 46 See Leybourn (1693), Barbour (1929) , Jones (1960) , Kepler (1975) , Van Niekerk (1998, p.225) , Ibbetson (2008) 
Licensing of brokers
Because of the central role of brokers in insurance markets, some governments made efforts to restrict their activities and control access to the brokerage profession.
In Amsterdam, a brokers guild was formed in 1578, and only contracts arranged by guild members were legally valid. Nevertheless, most brokers remained outside the guild; in 1600, only about one third of brokers were members. 50 Ultimately, a broker's reputation, his knowledge of the business and his access to underwriters were more important than whether the policies he wrote could be legally enforced. As the activities of guild members became more heavily regulated, an increasing number of brokers simply chose to act unofficially.
51
The municipal government, together with the brokers guild, made repeated but unsuccessful attempts to eradicate unauthorized brokers, before eventually abandoning these efforts in the eighteenth century.
In Venice, licensing of brokers was introduced in 1708. Brokers were required to keep a register of policies and submit it to the authorities once a month, but as in Amsterdam, many brokers ignored the regulation and remained unlicensed. In 1771, the Venetian senate approved a writ governing the number of brokers and their activities, prohibiting brokers from acting as underwriters, requiring them to take an oath, and excluding Jews from acting as brokers. However, it was opposed by brokers and insurers as being "impossible to carry out", and following a political debate, many of its provisions were struck out. Stefani (1958), p.123-4, 154, 165-171. To summarize, the overall picture that emerges is that governments' attempts to regulate and tax insurance markets very often met with limited success, in part because of the constraints imposed by interjurisdictional competition, and in part because of the difficulty of enforcing requirements that ran against merchants' interests and customs. If formal authorities became overbearing, merchants and brokers sometimes pushed back, forcing the regulations to be weakened; but in many cases, they simply opted out of the formal system and relied on informal enforcement and reputation mechanisms -which were indispensable in any case given the agency problems described earlier. Thus, for example, although the authorities in Amsterdam often passed formal regulations that were at odds with actual practice,
"it seems business 'on the streets', the daily routine of the insurance industry, went its own way. Ordinances and bylaws were, more often than not, breached, defied or simply ignored. Merchants and ship-owners were not permitted to insure up to the full value of their assets, but did so anyway. Brokers were not allowed to trade for their own account, but were notoriously known to do so.
Unauthorized brokers were never to be admitted to the Guild, but [some former unauthorized brokers were]." (Go 2009, p.145) .
Organizational form
As noted above, early marine insurance policies were underwritten by private individuals, with the transactions generally intermediated by brokers. This system had many virtues. It enabled the spread of risk much more widely than had earlier been possible, and it made use of the expertise of underwriters and brokers to determine premiums in a competitive market.
On the other hand, finding a new group of underwriters for each policy entailed substantial transaction costs, as did collecting losses in the event of a claim. Furthermore, the financial stability of individual underwriters, and therefore the security of the policy, was frequently uncertain, particularly during wartime.
Syndicates
One natural way to bolster the security of the policy and reduce the transaction costs of spreading risk was to form a stable syndicate of underwriters. In Venice, underwriting syndicates emerged in the sixteenth century, generally organized by brokers who were expert in evaluating risks, and who also themselves acted as underwriting members of the syndicate (thereby profiting from their knowledge while credibly demonstrating their good faith to the other underwriters). These syndicates were bound together for a specified time, and each partner had unlimited liability for losses. 53 Similar underwriting associations -generally small associations bound for a fixed duration -also existed in Bruges, Antwerp, Amsterdam and Rotterdam.
54
In France, too, some brokerages formed regular syndicates (chambres) of underwriters. Dawson (1931) describes the operation of one such syndicate of twelve merchants in Rouen between 1727-1742. Whereas private underwriters were each liable only for the amount they subscribed, the members of the French syndicates were jointly and severally liable for the policies they underwrote, and they also enhanced the security of the policy by raising an initial capital fund which was held in trust until all risks had expired, making dividend payments only when a substantial balance had accumulated. 55 The Rouen merchant Robert Dugard belonged to four chambres during the 1730s-50s, each of which had between 12 and 24 members. Similar companies were formed in other French ports, such as La Rochelle.
56
Syndicates also emerged in the American colonies. In October 1757, six Philadelphia merchants led by Thomas Willing formed a "Company for insuring Ships, Vessels, Goods and Merchandize", each agreeing to underwrite one sixth of the risks underwritten by Willing, who was limited to insuring £600 on any one risk. Unlike in the French case, however, the agreement did not involve any assumption of joint liability (which was prohibited by Britain's Bubble Act), and the company raised no capital fund. 57 In 1793, a Boston broker 53 Stefani (1958), p.101, 191-2. 54 Van Niekerk (1998), p.595-8. 55 Miquelon (1978 ), p.123, Dawson (1931 , p.xiv, xix. 56 Miquelon (1978) , Clark (1978), p.582, 596. 57 For the next couple of years, Thomas Willing & Co. underwrote through the Philadelphia brokerage of organized an association of thirteen underwriters according to a rotating scheme such that rather than splitting risks evenly, each underwriter was assigned £100 of the risks presented to the broker in alphabetical order, the next risk starting with the next underwriter in turn.
58

Mutual insurance
A widely used organizational form in insurance is the mutual, in which the owners (residual claimants) of the firm are the customers/policyholders themselves. The mutual form became widely used in life insurance during the nineteenth century. 59 It was generally less well suited to marine insurance because of the difficulty of determining "fair" premiums when merchants needed to insure diverse and idiosyncratic risks. In suitable circumstances, however, organizations resembling mutuals emerged.
In the Dutch province of Groningen, "hull clubs" were formed during the seventeenth century by shipowners who made regular runs carrying peat to Holland and northern Germany, returning with wood and other merchandise. The vessels employed in this trade were relatively homogenous, and the ship-masters were part of a close-knit community with intimate knowledge of the vessels and the risks, which helped to control opportunism. Over time, however, as the size and heterogeneity of the groups increased, the rules required to mediate disputes and control opportunistic behavior tended to become more formal and complex, and the mutuals had virtually disappeared by the nineteenth century ).
Around the same time, mutual insurance was also practiced by some Dutch whalers.
60
Similar hull clubs operated in the late 1700s and early 1800s in some regional British ports, particularly in the north-east. As in the Dutch case, these were small, local organizations of shipowners involved in high-frequency trade, such as carrying coal to London from the coal fields of northern England. Because of the high frequency of trade, and the relatively homogenous nature of the vessels and cargo involved, it was cheaper to insure each Thomas Wharton, covering 104 risks for a total of £41,284 in 1759 (Kingston 2013) . The initial one-year agreement was renewed for another year in October 1758 (Fowler 1888: 20-1) , but lasted at most a few years. 58 Gillingham (1993) , p.114. 59 Zanjani (2007); Wright and Kingston (2012) . 60 Van Niekerk (1998, p.636-9) .
other than to obtain formal insurance in London. In effect, the club members acted as a syndicate of private underwriters who regularly insured each others' vessels, the premiums being determined ex post based on realized losses (Kotowski 2007) . As in Groningen, the vessel owners generally knew each other well, and the hull clubs also had a social dimension.
Joint-stock corporations
The most important organizational innovation in marine insurance was the formation of joint-stock corporations beginning in the late seventeenth century. Corporations faced some disadvantages relative to private underwriting, including in particular agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control. But they had two major advantages. First, because corporations' underwriting was backed by a large capital stock, their policies were widely viewed as providing greater security than those of private underwriters; and second, the corporate form expanded the pool of capital available for underwriting by enabling those who had no specific knowledge of maritime affairs to, in effect, entrust their underwriting decisions to experts by buying shares. This enabled a much wider sharing of risk than had previously been possible.
However, incorporation -which entailed the creation of an artificial legal personality, with transferrable stock 61 -could only occur through an act of a ruler or legislature. Efforts to form corporations therefore frequently initiated political battles over whether a charter would be granted -typically, pitting the promoters of a new proposed corporation against incumbent brokers and underwriters. A common complaint was that the main objective of the promoters was to gain monopoly power and drive the private underwriters out of business.
In some cases these suspicions were probably well-founded. For example, proposals to form corporations in England in 1661 and in Venice in 1680 were dropped when the authorities approved the proposals to incorporate without granting a monopoly.
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Beginning in the early eighteenth century, however, joint-stock marine insurance cor-61 Limited liability was not a universal feature and generally not a primary motivation for incorporation before the late eighteenth century. See, eg., Harris (2000 , ch.1), Kingston (2011 .
62 Wright and Fayle (1928), p.41; Barbour (1929), p.577; Stefani (1958), p.125. porations were set up in many cities, some with a local monopoly and some without. In Genoa, a monopoly (granted in 1742) proved impossible to enforce, and was revoked in 1778, by which time there were several other companies as well as some private insurers operating in the city. Two joint-stock companies were formed in Venice in 1788, and more followed during the subsequent decade.
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In France, a King's emissary had attempted to persuade the merchants of Rouen to set up a marine insurance company in 1686, but met with little enthusiasm as the existing system was considered adequate and did not tie up capital in shares: "their pledge was their word and the trust it inspired". 68 Two large corporations were chartered in Paris in the 1750s, but they failed to monopolize the market, perhaps because they found themselves at a disadvantage relative to local underwriters when it came to evaluating risks:
In the seaports a company of merchants gathers together to underwrite insurance. They know their work and inform each other; they know whether the ship they are insuring is good or bad, whether the crew is good or bad, whether the captain is experienced and wise or ignorant and confused, whether the shippers are suspect, of good reputation or likely to be dishonest, whether the voyage is to be long, whether the season is beginning well or not; they know everything because everyone makes it his business to find out. In Paris they know nothing and for the Company to know all that, it would lose as much in the cost of postal charges and correspondence as it would earn in premiums."
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For a time, regional companies and the Paris corporations (operating through local agents in the ports) shared the market with individual underwriters. In the 1780s, individual underwriters still did about half the marine insurance in the medium-sized French port of La Rochelle. However, the increased risks during wartime tended over time to drive the individual underwriters from the market, and companies gradually took over.
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In colonial America, private underwriting through brokers had developed starting in the mid-eighteenth century (Kingston 2013) . Following independence, numerous marine insurance corporations were chartered by American states in the 1790s and early 1800s, and the practice of private underwriting died out soon thereafter. In particular, Kingston (2011) argues that the transition from private underwriting to corporate underwriting in America was accelerated by the increased risks to American shipping during the "Quasi-War" between America and France (1796-1800), when French privateers captured hundreds of American merchantmen, threatening the security of the private underwriters and highlighting the riskspreading advantages of the corporate form.
An alternative path: Lloyd's of London
The major exception to the general eighteenth-century trend towards corporations in marine insurance was Britain, where the industry became dominated by private underwriters 69 The Bordeaux magistrate Montesquieu in 1750, quoted by Bosher (1979) . 70 Clark (1978) ; Dawson (1931) .
centred at Lloyd's coffee house. The key event that ultimately led to this divergence was the "Bubble Act" of 1720, which made it illegal for joint-stock companies to operate without a royal charter or act of parliament. 71 In all industries except marine insurance, other kinds of unincorporated companies, including partnerships and trusts, were still allowed, and entrepreneurs were later able to use these devices to create (highly imperfect) substitutes for the joint-stock business corporation. For example, in fire and life insurance, a variety of organizational forms were used during the eighteenth century, including unincorporated joint-stock companies and mutuals.
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However, marine insurance received special treatment under the Bubble Act. During the stock market boom that culminated in the "South Sea Bubble" of 1720, several groups of merchants and speculators had petitioned to obtain charters for joint-stock marine insurance corporations. Predictably, this led to a political argument between the promoters of the proposed corporations, who argued that they would provide cheaper and more secure insurance than the existing system of private underwriting, and merchants and private underwriters, who claimed that the existing system was adequate, and that a monopoly would harm trade. Eventually the argument was settled when the two main groups of promoters offered a substantial payment to the crown in exchange for charters. Two joint stock corporations (the Royal Exchange Assurance and the London Assurance) were granted corporate charters, and all firms and partnerships, apart from these two corporations, were barred from writing marine insurance (private underwriting by individuals was still allowed).
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The Bubble Act had a tremendous impact on the development of marine insurance in Britain, but its ultimate effect was not that foreseen in 1720, when it was widely expected that private underwriting would not withstand competition from the corporations. Instead, in the decades following the passage of the Bubble Act, Lloyd's coffee house in London became a hub for information about ships and their crews, political and economic developments, and the many other factors affecting the risk of a voyage. Over time, a variety of business practices 71 Supple (1970) ; Harris (2000) , ch.3; Kingston (2007) . 72 Harris (2000) , ch.4. 73 Supple (1970 ), ch.2, Harris (2000 .
developed at Lloyd's as market participants grappled with the information asymmetries and agency problems inherent in marine insurance transactions. Kingston (2007) describes these practices and the development of Lloyd's in greater detail. The key point for our purposes is that much of the institutional development at Lloyd's occurred "spontaneously", without any conscious efforts to design new rules or change old ones. For the first half-century of its existence, Lloyd's had virtually no formal structure at all -it was, literally, just a coffee house where merchants and underwriters met. Eventually, in response to difficulties brought about by heightened wartime risks during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars Within the influential transactions-cost economics tradition, a basic premise is that organizational form, including the boundaries between markets and firms/hierarchies, will be determined so as to achieve efficiency (minimize transaction costs). 74 Any differences in organizational form, therefore, must be traced to differences in contracting conditions that affect transaction costs, such as technology. It is difficult to account for the emergence and persistence of two distinctly different organizational structures that had emerged in 74 See Tadelis and Williamson (2010) for a recent overview.
the marine insurance industry by the early nineteenth century using this approach. The merchants and underwriters in all these countries employed similar technology, and were very familiar with each others' modes of doing business.
The most plausible explanation is that rather than being designed to minimize transaction costs (a static model), the organizations that emerged in the marine insurance industry can only be understood as the outcome of a dynamic, historical process. In a world with multiple equilibria, the structure of organizations, including the boundaries between firms and markets, cannot be deduced from a knowledge of the characteristics of the transaction alone. Kingston (2007) argues that the eighteenth-century marine insurance market was indeed characterized by multiple equilibria. The network of merchants and underwriters that developed at Lloyd's, and the mechanisms they developed to share and interpret information, created a lemons problem that put British corporations at a disadvantage in evaluating risks and thereby prevented them from monopolizing the market. In contrast, in other countries corporations came to dominate the market. Each of these institutional equilibria, once established, was stable over time.
Equilibrium selection (and therefore the choice of organizational form) was driven by the timing of a series of historical events, including both exogenous shocks such as wars and endogenous parameter changes and learning processes. In Britain, the Bubble Act constrained the development of corporations for over a century, unintentionally insulating Lloyd's from competition from other kinds of firms or partnerships. The wars of the eighteenth century created stresses in the Lloyd's market, inducing institutional evolution that ultimately strengthened and formalized the institutions of private underwriting, and reinforced the equilibrium dominated by Lloyd's. In other countries, those same wars accelerated a shift away from private underwriting towards an equilibrium dominated by corporations.
Once established, each institutional structure -based on private or corporate underwritingbecame a stable equilibrium characterized by a complementary set of behavioral norms and expectations, reputation mechanisms, legal rules, information flows, and organizations.
Conclusion
A growing body of recent research studies institutions from an equilibrium perspective in which the constraints that motivate individual behavior are ultimately derived from expectations about the behavior of other actors in various contingencies, so that the "enforcement" of rules is considered as endogenous to the analysis. 75 From this equilibrium perspective, an attempt to introduce new "rules" can be seen as an attempt to bring about a coordinated change in expectations about the behavior of others, but in equilibrium it is ultimately these expectations, rather than the prescriptive content of the rules themselves, that motivate individual behavior. In particular, the introduction of a new law or formal rule may fail to change these expectations and equilibrium patterns of behavior, or may change them in unanticipated ways.
Although much remains to be learned about the long-run development of the institutions that governed early insurance markets, this brief survey suggests the value of this equilibrium perspective for understanding how these institutions evolved, the interaction (complementarity or conflict) between legal systems and informal modes of governance, the role of interest-group politics in shaping institutions, the role of political actors and the circumstances in which their interventions were helpful, unhelpful, or simply irrelevant for the operation of the market, the nature of the constraints on predation by rulers, the inter-relationships between institutional developments in different countries in a competitive international market, and so on.
The form of the insurance policy and informal modes of contract enforcement initially emerged as equilibria derived from the strategic interactions of merchants and underwriters as they attempted to navigate the complex agency problems inherent in marine insurance transactions. These equilibrium patterns of behavior and associated routines were, in effect, successfully "transplanted" from the Italian city-states as they came into widespread customary use among the international community of merchants, before eventually "hardening"
75 See Greif and Kingston (2011) for a survey. This approach constrasts with perspectives in which the question of how the "rules of the game" are enforced is treated as an important, but distinct issue from the content of the rules themselves (eg., North 1990 ).
into formal insurance law as judges sought to resolve disputes in accordance with existing merchant custom.
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Insofar as the development of insurance law and regulations formalized existing merchant practice, they had the capacity to strengthen the existing mechanisms of governance, helping to coordinate expectations, reduce uncertainty and transactions costs, and ultimately facilitate the development of more impersonal markets less reliant on personal trust between transactors. However, attempts to introduce new formal "rules" that clashed with existing equilibrium patterns of behavior frequently failed to bring about changes in merchant practice. Faced with onerous rules, regulations or taxes, participants in marine insurance markets had several options. Sometimes they were able to push back through the political process. In other cases, they simply voted with their feet by shifting their business to other jurisdictions or opting out of the formal legal system and relying on extralegal modes of contract enforcement. Governments could declare an insurance legally void, but that had little effect if contracts were not legally enforced, and indeed even when legal enforcement worked well, merchants also relied to a large degree on informal enforcement mechanisms, reputation and trust. Efforts to use political institutions to gain or confer special privileges, though often tried, generally also proved unsuccessful for similar reasons.
However, although political authorities were often severely constrained in the extent to which they could change "the rules", this is not to say that changes in formal rules had no effect. Sabine , for example, notes that the local authorities in Rotterdam were much less interventionist than those in the larger market of Amsterdam, and generally refrained from trying to pass ordinances that conflicted with merchant custom. As a result, she argues, formal rules in Rotterdam enhanced and supported informal rules, whereas the failure of Amsterdam's formal rules to effectively support the market created tensions between merchants, brokers, and underwriters, and ultimately helped to contribute to the Amsterdam market's relative decline.
76 Brousseau and Raynaud (2011) propose a theory of institutional change in which institutions that begin as local, flexible and voluntary orders compete for adherents, and those that are successful gradually spread, becoming more generic, rigid and mandatory in the process.
The equilibrium view also helps cast light on another issue raised in the introduction: the observed diversity of institutions which govern apparently similar transactions in different countries. Britain, America, France and Holland all began the eighteenth century with similar marine insurance institutions (based on underwriting by private individuals).
The development of distinct organizational forms in Britain and other countries despite a common starting point illustrates the possibility of multiple equilibria and how the timing of a sequence of historical events can lead to path-dependent institutional change.
